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October 01, 2013

Social Networks, Identity, Psudonyms, & Influence Podcast Episodes

Here are the first 4 episodes of The Social Media Clarity Podcast:

  1. Social Network: What is it, and where do I get one? (mp3) 26 Aug 2013
  2. HuffPo, Identity, and Abuse (mp3) 5 Sep 2013  NEW
  3. Save our Pseudonyms! (Guest: Dr. Bernie Hogan) (mp3) 16 Sep 2013  NEW
  4. Influence is a Graph (mp3) 30 Sep 2013  NEW
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July 02, 2010

BuildingReputation.com Blog/Wiki excerpts translated to 华语

There are several posts over at http://www.alienbin.com translating excerpts from this blog and the wiki version of Building Web Reputation Systems into Chinese:

来自《Building web reputation system》+ 少数本地化修改和个人见解

现实里的声誉

声誉系统在我们生活里无处不在。我们做决定的时候,如果没有足够多的参考信息(多半时候是没得的),声誉就在帮助我们做尽可能正确的决定。

If you know of any other commentaries/translations, please share them in the comments. We'd love to give them some reputation in the form of link-love.

May 05, 2010

Web2.0 Expo Talk — 5 Reputation Missteps

The slides from our presentation yesterday at the Web 2.0 Expo in San Francisco. We will soon be adding all speaker's notes into the full version on Slideshare.

October 21, 2009

User Motivations & System Incentives

Reputation Wednesday is an ongoing series of essays about reputation-related matters. This week's entry summarizes our model for describing user motivations and incentives for participation in reputation systems.

This is a short summary of a large section of Chapter 6 of our book, Building Web Reputation Systems, entitled Incentives for User Participation, Quality, and Moderation. For this blog post, the content is being shuffled a bit. First we will name the motivations and related incentive models, then we'll describe how reputation systems interact with each motivational category. To read a more detailed discussion of the incentive sub-categories, read the Chapter 6.

Motivations and Incentives for social media participation:

  • Altruistic motivation: for the good of others
    • Tit-for-Tat or Pay-it-Forward incentives: I do it because someone else did it for me first"
    • Friendship incentives: "I do it because I care about others who will consume this"
    • Know-it-All or Crusader or Opinionated incentives: "I do it because I know something everyone else needs to know"
  • Commercial motivation: to generate revenue
    • Direct revenue incentives: Extracting commercial value (better yet, cash) directly from the user as soon as possible
    • Branding incentives: Creating indirect value by promotion - revenue will follow later
  • Egocentric motivation: for self-gratification
    • Fulfillment incentives: The desire to complete a task, assigned by oneself, a friend, or the application
    • Recognition incentives: The desire for the praise of others
    • The Quest for Mastery: Personal and private motivation to improve oneself

Altruistic or Sharing Incentives

Altruistic, or sharing, incentives reflect the giving nature of users who have something to share-a story, a comment, a photo, an evaluation-and who feel compelled to share it on your site. Their incentives are internal: they may feel an obligation to another user or to a friend, or they may feel loyal to (or despise) your brand.

When you're considering reputation models that offer altruistic incentives, remember that these incentives exist in the realm of social norms-they're all about sharing, not accumulating commercial value or karma points. Avoid aggrandizing users driven by altruistic incentives-they don't want their contributions to be counted, recognized, ranked, evaluated, compensated, or rewarded in any significant way. Comparing their work to anyone else's will actually discourage them from participating.

(See more on Tit-for-Tat, Friend, and Know-it-All altruistic incentives.)

Commercial Incentives

Commercial incentives reflect people's motivation to do something for money, though the money may not come in the form of direct payment from the user to the content creator. Advertisers have a nearly scientific understanding of the significant commercial value of something they call branding. Likewise, influential bloggers know that their posts build their brand, which often involves the perception of them as subject matter experts. The standing that they establish may lead to opportunities such as speaking engagements, consulting contracts, improved permanent positions at universities or prominent corporations, or even a book deal. A few bloggers may actually receive payment for their online content, but more are capturing commercial value indirectly.

Reputation models that exhibit content control patterns based on commercial incentives must communicate a much stronger user identity. They need strong and distinctive user profiles with links to each user's valuable contributions and content. For example, as part of reinforcing her personal brand, an expert in textile design would want to share links to content that she thinks her fans will find noteworthy.

But don't confuse the need to support strong profiles for contributors with the need for a strong or prominent karma system. When a new brand is being introduced to a market, whether it's a new kind of dish soap or a new blogger on a topic, a karma system that favors established participants can be a disincentive to contribute content. A community decides how to treat newcomers-with open arms or with suspicion. An example of the latter is eBay, where all new sellers must "pay their dues" and bend over backward to get a dozen or so positive evaluations before the market at large will embrace them as trustworthy vendors. Whether you need karma in your commercial incentive model depends on the goals you set for your application. One possible rule of thumb: If users are going to pass money directly to other people they don't know, consider adding karma to help establish trust.

(See more on Direct revenue and Branding commercial incentives.)

Egocentric Incentives

Egocentric incentives are often exploited in the design online in computer games and many reputation based web sites. The simple desire to accomplish a task taps into deeply hard-wired motivations described in behavioral psychology as classical and operant conditioning (which involves training subjects to respond to food-related stimulus) and schedules of reinforcement. This research indicates that people can be influenced to repeat simple tasks by providing periodic rewards, even a reward as simple as a pleasing sound.

But, an individual animal's behavior in the social vacuum of a research lab is not the same as the ways in which we very social humans reflect our egocentric behaviors to one another. Humans make teams and compete in tournaments. We follow leaderboards comparing ourselves to others and comparing groups that we associate ourselves with. Even if our accomplishments don't help another soul or generate any revenue for us personally, we often want to feel recognized for them. Even if we don't seek accolades from our peers, we want to be able to demonstrate mastery of something-to hear the message "You did it! Good job!"

Therefore, in a reputation system based on egocentric incentives, user profiles are a key requirement. In this kind of system, users need someplace to show off their accomplishments-even if only to themselves. Almost by definition, egocentric incentives involve one or more forms of karma. Even with only a simple system of granting trophies for achievements, users will compare their collections to one another. New norms will appear that look more like market norms than social norms: people will trade favors to advance their karma, people will attempt to cheat to get an advantage, and those who feel they can't compete will opt out altogether.

Egocentric incentives and karma do provide very powerful motivations, but they are almost antithetical to altruistic ones. The egocentric incentives of many systems have been over-designed, leading to communities consisting almost exclusively of experts. Consider just about any online role playing game that survived more than three years. For example, to retain its highest-level users and the revenue stream they produce, Worlds of Warcraft must continually produce new content targeted at those users. If they stop producing new content for their most dedicated users, their business will collapse. This elder game focus stunts WoW's growth -- parent company Blizzard has all-but-abandoned improvements aimed at acquiring new users. When new users do arrive (usually in the wake of a marketing promotion), they end up playing alone because the veteran players are only interested in the new content and don't want to bother going through the long slog of playing through the lowest levels of the game yet again.

(See more on Fulfillment, Recognition, and Quest-for-Mastery egocentric incentives.)

September 30, 2009

First Mover Effects

Reputation Wednesday is an ongoing series of essays about reputation-related matters. This week's essay is concerned with important downstream effects that can arise from the first tentative days & weeks of a community's formation. It is excerpted from Chapter 4: Building Blocks and Reputation Tips.

When an application handles quantitative measures based on user input, whether it's ratings or measuring participation by counting the number of contributions to a site, several issues arise-all resulting from bootstrapping of communities-that we group together under the term first-mover effects.

Early Behavior Modeling and Early-Ratings Bias

The first people to contribute to a site have a disproportionate effect on the character and future contributions of others. After all, this is social media, and people usually try to fit into any new environment. For example, if the tone of comments is negative, new contributors will also tend to be negative, which will also lead to bias in any user-generated ratings. See Ratings Bias Effects.

When an operator introduces user-generated content and associated reputation systems, it is important to take explicit steps to model behavior for the earliest users in order to set the pattern for those who follow.

Discouraging New Contributors

Take special care with systems that contain leaderboards when they're used either for content or for users. Items displayed on leaderboards tend to stay on the leaderboards, because the more people who see those items and click, rate, and comment on them, the more who will follow suit, creating a self-sustaining feedback loop.

This loop not only keeps newer items and users from breaking into the leaderboards, it discourages new users from even making the effort to participate by giving the impression that they are too late to influence the result in any significant way. Though this phenomenon applies to all reputation scores, even for digital cameras, it's particularly acute in the case of simple point-based karma systems, which give active users ever more points for activity so that leaders, over years of feverish activity, amass millions of points, making it mathematically impossible for new users to ever catch up.

September 09, 2009

Time Decay in Reputation Systems

Reputation Wednesday is an ongoing series of essays about reputation-related matters. This week's essay is excerpted from Chapter 4: Building Blocks and Reputation Tips.

Time leeches value from reputation: the section called “First Mover Effects” discussed how simple reputation systems grant early contributions are disproportionately valued over time, but there's also the simple problem that ratings become stale over time as their target reputable entities change or become unfashionable - businesses change ownership, technology becomes obsolete, cultural mores shift.

The key insight to dealing with this problem is to remember the expression “What did you do for me this week?” When you're considering how your reputation system will display reputation and use it indirectly to modify the experience of users, remember to account for time value. A common method for compensating for time in reputation values is to apply a decay function: subtract value from the older reputations as time goes on, at a rate that is appropriate to the context. For example, digital camera ratings for resolution should probably lose half their weight every year, whereas restaurant reviews should only lose 10% of their value in the same interval.

Here are some specific algorithms for decaying a reputation score over time:

  • Linear Aggregate Decay
    • Every score in the corpus is decreased by a fixed percentage per unit time elapsed, whenever it is recalculated. This is high performance, but scarcely updated reputations will have dispassionately high values. To compensate, a timer input can perform the decay process at regular intervals.
  • Dynamic Decay Recalculation
    • Every time a score is added to the aggregate, recalculate the value of every contributing score. This method provides a smoother curve, but it tends to become computationally expensive O(n2) over time.
  • Window-based Decay Recalculation
    • The Yahoo! Spammer IP reputation system has used a time window based decay calculation: fixed time or a fixed-size window of previous contributing claim values is kept with the reputation for dynamic recalculation when needed. New values push old values out of the window, and the aggregate reputation is recalculated from those that remain. This method produces a score with the most recent information available, but the information for low-liquidity aggregates may still be old.
  • Time-limited Recalculation
    • This is the de facto method that most engineers use to present any information in an application: use all of the ratings in a time range from the database and compute the score just in time. This is the most costly method, because it involves always hitting the database to consider an aggregate reputation (say, for a ranked list of hotels), when 99% of the time the value is exactly the same as it was the last time it was calculated. This method also may throw away still contextually valid reputation. We recommend trying some of the higher-performance suggestions above.

January 07, 2009

Ze Frank on Participation

This requires much more attention than I'm able to give it at the moment, but this blog from Ze Frank on fostering online participation looks phenomenally good, and touches on many of the discussion points that we'd like to cover in Bw20RS. Of course, if anyone's qualified to talk about how to engage with your community in a meaningful, and non-demeaning way, it's Ze. So I'd encourage anyone to go check that stuff out, while we work on stealing .. er.. 'assimilating' Ze's lessons into our own flight-plan. :-) (Via Kottke.)